Newest epidode – hear now.
DOUG. Busts, shutdowns, Samba, and GitHub.
All that, and extra, on the Bare Safety podcast.
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Welcome to the podcast, all people.
I’m Doug Aamoth; he’s Paul Ducklin.
Paul, how do you do in the present day, Sir?
DUCK. I’m very effectively, Douglas.
DOUG. Allow us to begin the present with our Tech Historical past phase – that is an attention-grabbing one.
This week, on 01 February 1982, the Intel 80286 16-bit microprocessor was launched, and went on to grow to be a mainstay in IBM PC/AT computer systems for years.
Apparently, Intel didn’t count on the 286 for use for private computer systems, and designed a chip with multitasking and multi-user programs in thoughts.
DUCK. Its main use, as you say, was the PC/AT, the “Superior Expertise” pc from IBM, which was principally designed to run DOS.
Though DOS is proscribed to 1MB of RAM (or 640KB RAM and the remaining ROM), you would have further reminiscence, and you would use it for issues like…
…bear in mind HIMEM.SYS, and RAM caches, all of that stuff?
Besides that as a result of Intel had safety in thoughts, bless their hearts, after they designed the 286…
…when you had switched from the mode the place it ran like an 8086 into the super-powerful so-called “protected mode”, *you couldn’t change again*.
When you flipped into the mode that allow you to entry your HIMEM or your RAMDISK, you had been caught.
You couldn’t return and keep on operating DOS!
And IBM really jury-rigged their PC – you despatched this particular command to (imagine it or not) the keyboard controller, and the keyboard controller principally rebooted the CPU.
Then, when the CPU began up once more, the BIOS mentioned, “Oh, that’s not a real reboot, that’s a sneaky ‘change again illegally to actual mode’ reboot,” [LAUGHTER] and it went again to the place you had been in DOS.
So the issue is, it was super-inefficient.
The opposite factor with the 286, despite the fact that it may entry 16MB RAM in complete, is that, identical to the 8086, it may solely work on a most of 64KB at a time.
So the 64-kilobyte restrict was nonetheless principally wired into the DNA of that 286 microprocessor.
It was majestically and needlessly, because it turned out, sophisticated.
It’s form of like a product that was super-cool, however didn’t actually match a necessity out there on the time, sadly.
DOUG. Nicely, let’s begin in on our first tales.
We have now a two-pack – it’s crime time.
Let’s discuss shutdowns and lock-ups, beginning with the FBI shutting down the Hive ransomware servers in the end.
That’s excellent news!
DUCK. It does appear so, doesn’t it, Doug?
Though we have to say, as we at all times do, primarily, that “cybercrime abhors a vacuum”.
Sadly, different operators steam in when one lot get busted…
…or if all that occurs is that their servers get taken down, and the precise folks working them don’t get recognized and arrested, usually what occurs is that they maintain their heads beneath the parapet for a short time, after which they simply pop up someplace else.
Typically they reinvent the previous model, simply to thumb their nostril on the world.
Typically they’d come again with a brand new title.
So the factor with Hive – it seems that the FBI had infiltrated the Hive ransomware gang, presumably by taking up some sysadmin’s account, and apparently that occurred in the course of 2022.
However, as we’ve got mentioned on the podcast earlier than, with the darkish internet, the truth that you’ve got somebody’s account and you may log in as them…
…you continue to can’t simply lookup the IP variety of the server you’re connecting to, as a result of the darkish internet is hiding that.
So it appears that evidently, for the primary a part of this operation, the FBI weren’t really in a position to determine the place the servers had been, though apparently they had been in a position to get free decryption keys for fairly plenty of folks – I feel a number of hundred victims.
In order that was fairly excellent news!
After which, whether or not it was some operational intelligence blunder, whether or not they simply acquired fortunate, or… we don’t know, however it appears that evidently ultimately they did work out the place the servers had been, and bingo!
Shutdown!
DOUG. OK, superb.
After which our second of those crime tales.
We’ve acquired a Dutch suspect in custody, charged for not simply private information theft, however [DOOM-LADEN VOICE] “megatheft”, as you place it. Paul:
Dutch suspect locked up for alleged private information megathefts
DUCK. Sure!
It appears that evidently his “job” was… he finds information, or buys information from different folks, or breaks into websites and steals large tranches of information himself.
Then he slices-and-dices it in numerous methods, and places it up on the market on the darkish internet.
He was caught as a result of the corporate that appears after TV licensing in Austria (numerous European nations require you to have a allow to personal and function a TV set, which primarily funds nationwide tv)… these databases just about have each family, minus just a few.
The Austrian authorities grew to become conscious that there was a database up on the market on the darkish internet that appeared very very like the form of information you’d get – the fields, and the best way every little thing was formatted… “That appears like ours, that appears like Austrian TV licences. My gosh!”
In order that they did a very cool factor, Doug.
They did an undercover buy-back, and within the means of doing so, they really acquired a very good deal with on the place the individual was: “It seems like this individual might be in Amsterdam, within the Netherlands.”
And they also acquired in contact with their pals within the Dutch police, and the Dutch had been in a position to get warrants, and discover out extra, and do some raids, and bust someone for this crime.
Maybe unusually, they acquired the appropriate from the courtroom, primarily, to carry the man incommunicado – it was all a secret.
He was simply locked away, didn’t get bail – in truth, they’ve nonetheless acquired a pair extra months, I feel, that they’ll maintain him.
So he’s not getting out.
I’m assuming they’re apprehensive that [A] he’s acquired a great deal of cryptocurrency mendacity round, so he’d in all probability do a runner, and [B] he’d in all probability tip off all his compadres within the cyberunderworld.
It additionally appeared that he was making loads of cash out of it, as a result of he’s additionally being charged with cash laundering – the Dutch police declare to have proof that he personally cashed out someplace within the area of half-a-million euros of cryptocoins final yr.
So there you’re!
Various derring-do in an investigation, as soon as once more.
DOUG. Sure, certainly.
OK, this can be a traditional “We’ll regulate that!” kind of story.
Within the meantime, we’ve got a Samba logon bug that reminds us why cryptographic agility is so essential:
Severe Safety: The Samba logon bug attributable to outdated crypto
DUCK. It’s a reminder that when the cryptographic gurus of the world say, “XYZ algorithm is now not match for function, please cease utilizing it”, snd the yr is – let’s assume – the mid 2000s…
…it’s effectively value listening!
Be sure that there isn’t some legacy code that drags on, since you kind-of suppose, “Nobody will use it.”
It is a logon course of in Microsoft Home windows networking which depends on the MD5 hashing algorithm.
And the issue with the MD5 hashing algorithm is it’s a lot too simple to create two recordsdata which have precisely the identical hash.
That shouldn’t occur!
For me to get two separate inputs which have precisely the identical hash ought to take me, on my laptop computer, roughly 10,000 years…
DOUG. Roughly! [LAUGHS]
DUCK. Kind of.
Nevertheless, only for that article alone, utilizing instruments developed by a Dutch cryptographer for his Grasp’s thesis again in 2007, I created *ten* colliding MD5 hash-pair recordsdata…
…in a most of 14 seconds (for one in every of them) and a minimal of underneath half a second.
So, billions of instances sooner than it’s alleged to be attainable.
You possibly can due to this fact be completely certain that the MD5 hash algorithm *merely doesn’t stay as much as its promise*.
That’s the core of this bug.
Mainly, in the course of the authentication course of, there’s a component that claims, “You understand what, we’re going to create this super-secure authentication token from information provided by the consumer, and utilizing a secret key provided by the consumer. So, what we’ll do is we’ll first do an MD5 hash of the info to make it good and quick, after which we’ll create the authentication code *primarily based on that 128-bit hash.”
In idea, for those who’re an attacker, you possibly can create different enter information *that can give you the identical authentication hash*.
And which means you possibly can persuade the opposite finish, “Sure, I *should* know the key key, in any other case how may I presumably create the appropriate authentication code?”
The reply is: you cheat in the course of the method, by feeding in information that simply occurs to give you the identical hash, which is what the authentication code is predicated upon.
The MD5 algorithm died years in the past, however but it lives on – and it shouldn’t!
So the repair is simple.
Samba simply mentioned, “What we’re going to do is, if you wish to use this previous algorithm, any further, you’ll have to bounce by hoops to show it on. And if that breaks issues, and if abruptly you possibly can’t log into your personal community since you had been utilizing weak safety with out realising it… that’s the worth we’re all keen to pay.”
And I agree with that.
DOUG. OK, it’s model 4.17.5 that now forces these two choices, so head on the market and choose that up for those who haven’t already.
And final, however definitely not least, we’ve acquired code-signing certificates stolen from GitHub.
However there’s a silver lining right here, thankfully:
GitHub code-signing certificates stolen (however shall be revoked this week)
DUCK. It’s been fairly the few months for cloud breaches and potential provide chain assaults.
DOUG. Significantly!
DUCK. “Oh expensive, stolen signing keys”… GitHub realised this had occurred on 07 December 2022.
Now, hats off to them, they realised the very day after the crooks had acquired in.
The issue is that they hadn’t acquired into wander round – it appears that evidently their skill to get in was primarily based on the truth that they might obtain non-public GitHub repositories.
This isn’t a breach of the GitHub programs, or the GitHub infrastructure, or how GitHub shops recordsdata – it’s simply that GitHub’s code on GitHub… a few of the stuff that was alleged to be non-public acquired downloaded.
And as we’ve spoken about earlier than, the issue when supply code repositories which are alleged to be non-public get downloaded…
…the issue is that, surprisingly usually, these repositories may need stuff in that you just don’t wish to make public.
For instance, passwords to different companies.
And, importantly, the code-signing keys – your signet ring, that you just use to place your little seal within the wax of this system that you just really construct.
Even for those who’re an open supply undertaking, you’re not going to place your code-signing keys within the public model of the supply code!
In order that was GitHub’s concern: “Oh expensive. We discovered the crooks nearly instantly, however they got here in, they grabbed the code, they went… thus, harm already completed.”
It took them fairly a very long time, almost two months, to determine what they might say about this.
Or not less than it took two months till they mentioned something about it.
And it sounds as if the one issues that may impact prospects that did get stolen had been certainly code-signing keys.
Solely two tasks had been affected.
One is the supply code editor often called “Atom”, GitHub Atom.
That was principally outmoded in most builders’ lives by Visible Studio Code [LAUGHS], so the entire undertaking acquired discontinued in the course of 2022, and its final safety replace was December 2022.
So that you in all probability shouldn’t be utilizing Atom anyway.
And the excellent news is that, as a result of they weren’t going to be constructing it any extra, the certificates concerned…
…most of them have already expired.
And ultimately, GitHub discovered, I feel, that there are solely three stolen certificates that had been really nonetheless legitimate, in different phrases, that crooks may really use for signing something.
And people three certificates had been all encrypted.
Certainly one of them expired on 04 January 2023, and it doesn’t appear that the crooks did crack that password, as a result of I’m not conscious of any malware that was signed with that certificates within the hole between the crooks getting in and the certificates expiring one month later.
There’s a second certificates that expires the day we’re recording the podcast, Wednesday, 01 February 2022; I’m not conscious of that one having been abused, both.
The one outlier in all of this can be a code-signing certificates that, sadly, doesn’t expire till 2027, and that’s for signing Apple applications.
So GitHub has mentioned to Apple, “Be careful for something that comes alongside that’s signed with that.”
And from 02 February 2022, all the code-signing certificates that had been stolen (even those which have already expired) shall be revoked.
So it seems as if this can be a case of “all’s effectively that ends effectively.”
After all, there’s a minor side-effect right here, and that’s that for those who’re utilizing the GitHub Desktop product, or for those who’re nonetheless utilizing the Atom editor, then primarily GitHub is revoking signing keys *for their very own apps*.
Within the case of the GitHub Desktop, you completely must improve, which you need to be doing anyway.
Satirically, as a result of Atom is discontinued… for those who desperately must proceed utilizing it, you really should downgrade barely to the latest model of the app that was signed with a certificates that’s not going to get revoked.
I could have made that sound extra sophisticated than it truly is…
…however it’s a nasty search for GitHub, as a result of they did get breached.
It’s one other unhealthy search for GitHub that included within the breach had been code-signing certificates.
However it’s a very good search for GitHub that, by the best way they managed these certificates. most of them had been now not of any use.
Two of the three that might be harmful can have expired by the point you hearken to this podcast, and the final one, in your phrases, Doug, “they’re actually maintaining a tally of.”
Additionally, they’ve revoked all of the certificates, regardless of the very fact that there’s a knock-on impact on their very own code.
So, they’re primarily disowning their very own certificates, and a few of their very own signed applications, for the better good of all.
And I feel that’s good!
DOUG. Alright, good job by GitHub.
And, because the solar begins to set on our present for in the present day, it’s time to listen to from one in every of our readers.
Nicely, for those who bear in mind from final week, we’ve been attempting to assist out reader Steven roll his personal USB-key-based password supervisor.
Primarily based on his quandary, reader Paul asks:
Why not simply retailer your passwords on a USB keep on with {hardware} encryption and a keypad… in a conveyable password supervisor equivalent to KeePass? No must invent your personal, simply shell out a couple of bucks and maintain a backup someplace, like in a protected.
DUCK. Not a nasty thought in any respect. Doug!
I’ve been that means to buy-and-try a kind of particular USB drives… you get hard-disk sized ones (though they’ve SSDs basically nowadays), the place there’s loads of room for a keypad on the highest of the drive.
However you even get USB sticks, they usually usually have two rows of 5 keys or two rows of six keys subsequent to one another.
It’s not like these commodity USB drives that, say, “Contains free encryption software program,” which is on the stick and you may then set up it in your pc.
The thought is that it’s like BitLocker or FileVault or LUKS, like we spoke about final week.
There’s a full-disk encryption layer *contained in the drive enclosure itself*, and as quickly as you unplug it, even for those who don’t unmount it correctly, for those who simply yank it out of the pc…
…when the ability goes down, the important thing will get flushed from reminiscence and the factor will get locked once more.
I assume the burning query is, “Nicely, why doesn’t everybody simply use these as USB keys, as a substitute of normal USB gadgets?”
And there are two causes: the primary is that it’s a trouble, and the opposite drawback is that they’re a lot, rather more costly than common USB keys.
So I feel, “Sure, that’s an excellent thought.”
The issue is, as a result of they’re not mainstream merchandise, I don’t have any I can suggest – I’ve by no means tried one.
And you’ll’t simply go into the typical PC store and purchase one.
So if any listeners have a model, or a kind, or a selected class of such product that they use and like…
…we’d love to listen to about it, so do tell us!
DOUG. OK, nice.. I like slightly crowd-sourcing, folks serving to folks.
Thanks very a lot, Paul, for sending that in.
If in case you have an attention-grabbing story, remark or query you’d wish to submit, we’d like to learn it on the podcast.
You possibly can e-mail suggestions@sophos.com, touch upon any one in every of our articles, or hit us up on social: @NakedSecurity.
That’s our present for in the present day – thanks very a lot for listening.
For Paul Ducklin, I’m Doug Aamoth, reminding you till subsequent time to…
BOTH. Keep safe!
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